Review DAO Research Trends: Reflections and Learnings from the First European DAO Workshop (DAWO) MichaelLustenberger1,* ,FlorianSpychiger1 ,LukasKüng1,2 ,EleonóraBassi1 andSabrinaWollenschläger1 1 InstituteforOrganizationalViability,SchoolofManagement&Law,ZHAWZurichUniversityofApplied Sciences,8401Winterthur,Switzerland;spyc@zhaw.ch(F.S.);kueu@zhaw.ch(L.K.);baso@zhaw.ch(E.B.); sabrina.wollenschlaeger@hslu.ch(S.W.) 2 InstituteForTheFuture,SchoolofBusiness,UniversityofNicosia,Nicosia2417,Cyprus * Correspondence:luse@zhaw.ch Abstract: DecentralizedAutonomousOrganizations(DAOs)representatransformative shiftinorganizationalstructures,combiningdecentralizedgovernancewithblockchain- basedsmartcontracts. WhileDAOspresentsignificantopportunitiesforinnovation,they are confronted with several unresolved challenges, such as the centralization of power, thedesignofeffectivegovernancemechanisms,andthelegaluncertaintiessurrounding theiroperation. DrawingoninsightsfromrecentstudiesanddiscussionspresentedinJuly 2024 at DAWO24, the first European DAO Workshop, this article explores these issues. ThepurposeofthisarticleistoidentifyandanalyzethecriticalresearchstreamsinDAO studies,particularlyingovernancemechanisms,technicalframeworks,valueassessment, andlegaldimensions. Asystematicapproach,followingthePRISMAmethodology,was employedtoanalyzecontributionsfrom14extendedabstractsand11fullpaperspresented atDAWO24. Thefindingshighlighttheneedformoreequitablegovernancestructures, secureandscalabletechnicalframeworks,standardizedtoolsforassessingDAOs’value, andcoherentlegalframeworkstosupportdecentralizedoperations. Thearticleconcludes AcademicEditors:IvoPereira, byoutliningfutureresearchdirections,urginginterdisciplinarycollaborationtoaddress ChristopheSoares,Rui HumbertoPereira,AnaM.Madureira, currentgapsandoptimizeDAOdesign,operation,andregulation. FilipeSáandJuanFranciscoDePaz Santana Keywords: Decentralized Autonomous Organization; DAO; research trends; future Received:29January2025 directions;DAWO;review Revised:21February2025 Accepted:18March2025 Published:22March2025 Citation: Lustenberger,M.; 1. Introduction Spychiger,F.;Küng,L.;Bassi,E.; Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) have emerged as a novel form Wollenschläger,S.DAOResearch oforganizationalstructure,buttheirdefinitionremainsfluidintheliterature. Initialat- Trends:ReflectionsandLearnings temptstodefineDAOs,suchasVitalikButerin’s[1]descriptionofaDAO“asanentity fromtheFirstEuropeanDAO Workshop(DAWO).Appl.Sci.2025, thatlivesontheinternetandexistsautonomously,butalsoreliesheavilyonindividuals 15,3491. https://doi.org/10.3390/ to take on certain tasks that the autonomous entity cannot do itself”, emphasize their app15073491 autonomous operation on the internet, supplemented by human intervention for tasks Copyright:©2025bytheauthors. beyondautomation. EarlyresearchintoDAOshasexploredtheirpotentialasalternative LicenseeMDPI,Basel,Switzerland. governance institutions, distinct from markets, hierarchies, and relational contracts, as Thisarticleisanopenaccessarticle framedbyWilliamson’s[2]newinstitutionaleconomics. Davidsonetal.[3](p. 654)charac- distributedunderthetermsand terizeDAOsas“self-governingorganizationswiththecoordinationpropertiesofamarket, conditionsoftheCreativeCommons thegovernancepropertiesofacommons,andtheconstitutional,legal,andmonetaryprop- Attribution(CCBY)license ertiesofanation-state”. Scholars,suchasCataliniandGans[4]andLumineauetal.[5], (https://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/). emphasizehowblockchaintechnologycanreducetransactioncosts,includingthoserelated Appl.Sci.2025,15,3491 https://doi.org/10.3390/app15073491 Appl.Sci.2025,15,3491 2of14 tosearching,networking,monitoring,verification,andenforcement. Additionally,studies byBecketal.[6]andZhaoetal.[7]underscorethegovernancecapabilitiesofDAOsin coordinating decentralized communities, offering an efficient alternative to traditional organizationalstructures. Overtime,scholarslikeHassanandDeFilippi[8]andSantanaandAlbareda[9]further refinedtheconcept,emphasizingDAOs’relianceonblockchain-based,self-executingrules, decentralizedgovernance,andopencommunities. Morerecentinterpretations,suchas thosefromtheWorldEconomicForum[10]andtheEthereumcommunity[11],underscore the transparency, community-oriented governance, and the role of smart contracts in ensuringthatdecisionsandoperationsarevisibleandcollectivelycontrolled. Overall, DAOsarerecognizedfortheirtransformativeorganizationalmodels, har- nessingdecentralizeddecision-makingandgovernancetokenstomanageorganizational functions[12]. Byeliminatingcentralizedcontrolandenablingcollectivedecision-making, DAOsofferamoredemocratic,transparent,andefficientalternativetotraditionalhier- archicalstructures[13]. Uniswapexemplifiesthisdecentralizedgovernanceinpractice, overseeingadecentralizedexchangeprotocol(DEX)throughatoken-basedgovernance model. Anonymous UNI token holders propose and vote on protocol changes, with decisions executed via smart contracts to ensure transparency and automation. While Uniswaphasnoformallegalentity,theUniSwapFoundationsupportsgovernanceinitia- tives. Uniswap’seconomicmodelreliesonliquidityproviderfees,acommunitytreasury, andpotentialprotocolfeeallocations. Despiteitsdecentralizedstructure,challenges,such astokenconcentration,voterapathy,andregulatoryuncertainty,remainkeyconsiderations foritsgovernancemodel. FurtherexamplesillustratethediversityofDAOapplications. Sky(formerlyMak- erDAO)governstheUSDS(formerlyDAI)stablecoin,allowingmemberstouseitsSKY governancetokenstoensureitsefficiency,transparencyandstability. MolochDAOisan exampleofamission-drivenDAO,poolingmembers’contributionstofundblockchain infrastructureasadigitalpublicgood. HoprfurtherdemonstrateshowDAOscangov- erndigitalinfrastructure,asitstokenholderscollectivelymanagetheHOPRprotocol,a privacy-focusedcommunicationnetwork,andvoteonitsdevelopmentandmaintenance. By focusing on NFTs, Flamingo DAO aims to explore emerging investment opportuni- tiesforownable,blockchain-basedassetsthatincludedigitalart,collectibles,andin-game assets.Bridgingthedigitalandphysicalworlds,Cabingoesastepfurther,usingblockchain- basedgovernancetomanagerealestate,suchaslandandhomes,whilefacilitatingreal-life gatheringstostrengthenlocalcommunities. Theseexampleshighlighttheversatilityof DAOs in addressing different use cases, from digital asset management to real-world applications,suchaspropertygovernance. AlloftheseDAOsleveragethecollectivein- telligenceofparticipants,aimingtominimizetheneedforcentralauthorityandpromote equitablegovernance[14]. ItispreciselytheseDAOfeaturesthatpromptimportantques- tionsconcerningthecompatibilitywithcurrenteconomicandregulatoryframeworks[15], thefairnessandinclusivityofcontemporarydecision-makingprocesses[16,17],andthe feasibilityofimplementingsuchstructuresforcommunitiesusingthecurrenttechnical toolset[18,19]. DAOsconfrontsignificantchallengesandunresolvedquestionsthatarepivotalfor theiradaptationandtheirfurtherdevelopmentasalternativeorganizationalstructures. In arecenteffortbyseveralprominentDAOresearchers, thesechallengeshavebeencom- piled, highlighting the need for interdisciplinary collaboration [20]. DAWO24, the first EuropeanDAOWorkshop,representsaconcreteresponsetothiscallformoreinterdisci- plinaryresearch,asoutlinedbyTanetal.[20]intheirpaperon“OpenproblemsinDAOs”. At DAWO24 in July 2024 at the ZHAW School of Management and Law, Winterthur, Appl.Sci.2025,15,3491 3of14 Switzerland(https://dawo24.org/,accessedon10March2025),thisinterdisciplinarity wasfosteredbygivingresearchersaplatformtopresenttheircurrentresearchtoaninterna- tionalaudienceofDAOscholars,comingfromdifferentresearchfields,rangingfromlegal, philosophical,politicalscience,economic,computerscience,finance,andcommunication. DAWO24providedanopportunitytocollaborativelydelveintoworkshopsessions,offer- ingacriticalforumforexploringthecomplexnatureofDAOsandblockchaingovernance. DiscussionsattheworkshopspannedawiderangeoftopicsrelatedtoDAOs,enabling newresearchopportunitiestobeexploredandtomatchcommonresearchinterests. Given theinterdisciplinarynatureofDAWO24andthecuratedselectionofpeer-reviewedcon- tributions,thisworkshopservesasavaluabledatasetforcapturingthemostrecentand pressingchallengesinDAOresearch. Byfocusingonthesecontributions,weprovidea structured synthesis of current discussions among leading DAO scholars, ensuring an up-to-datereflectionofthestateofthefield. Theobjectiveofthispaperistosystematicallyanalyzeandsynthesizesthecritical topicsandresearchquestionsinrecentstudiesonDAOspresentedanddiscussedatthe DAWO24withtheaimtoprovideastructuredoverviewofthecriticalchallengesDAOs faceandtoidentifypromisingavenuesforfutureresearch. Specifically,itseekstoaddress thefollowingresearchquestion: Whatarethekeyunresolvedchallengesandemerging researchdirectionsinthefieldofDAOs,asidentifiedthroughinterdisciplinarydiscussions atDAWO24? Toensureastructuredandreplicableapproach,wefollowedthePRISMA(Preferred ReportingItemsforSystematicReviewsandMeta-Analyses)methodology[21]. Byadopt- ingthismeta-analysismethodology,weensuretransparencyandrigorinourapproach, offeringmeasurableandreplicableresultsforresearchersandpractitionersalike. Specifi- cally,weanalyzedthecontributionsofthefirstEuropeanDAOWorkshop,whichincluded 14extendedabstractsand11fullpapers. Thesecontributionsweresystematicallysum- marizedandevaluatedtoextracttheirkeyfindings. FollowingthePRISMAframework, wethenanalyzedthecontenttofilteroutthemainfindings,groupingthemintothematic clustersbasedoncommonalities. Thisgroupingwasconductedthroughaniterativecoding process,wherewefirstidentifiedrecurringkeywordsandconceptsacrossthecontribu- tions. Thesewerethencategorizedintopreliminarythemes,whichwererefinedthrough discussionsamongtheauthorstoensurecoherenceandrelevance. Throughthisprocess, fourdominantthemesemerged,eachrepresentingakeyresearchchallengeordirectionin DAOresearch. Thesethemeswereselectedbasedontheirprominenceintheanalyzedcon- tributionsandtheiralignmentwiththeoverarchingdiscussionsatDAWO24. Eachcluster wasfurthersynthesizedtodistillitsmaininsights,whichformthecorecontributionsof thisarticle. ThesefindingsnotonlyhighlightthecriticaltopicsinDAOresearch,butalso provideafoundationforfutureinquiriesinthisfield. Byhighlightingaspects,suchasgovernancestructures,stakeholderinfluence,tech- nicalinfrastructure,andlegalimplications,thisarticleseekstoprovideacomprehensive understanding of the current questions DAOs impose and gives recommendations on whichtopicsfutureresearchshouldfocuson. Addressingtheseissuesisessentialforopti- mizingthedesignandimplementationofDAOs,therebyadvancingthefieldtowardsmore effectiveandequitabledigitalorganizations. Hence,inSection2,wewilldiscussdifferent authorsanalyzinggovernancemechanisms,inSection3wewilllookatvariousscholars developing tools and frameworks to better understand DAOs. Section 4 will examine researchersfocusingonthevalueofDAOs,whileSection5willexplorestudiesconcerned withthelegalandregulatoryaspectsofDAOs. Followingthediscussionoffindingsand furtherresearchdirectionsinSection6,thefinalSectionwillconcludebyemphasizingthe Appl.Sci.2025,15,3491 4of14 importanceofcontinuedinterdisciplinaryresearchtoovercomethecurrentchallengesand realizethefullpotentialofDAOs. 2. AnalyzingGovernanceMechanismsinDAOs UnderstandinggovernanceinDAOsrequiresacomprehensiveanalysisofhowvarious stakeholdersinfluencedecision-makingprocessesandtheoveralleffectivenessofthese mechanisms[7,22]. Centraltothisinvestigationistheinfluenceofearlyinvestors,team members,andventurecapitalists[23]. Theconcentrationofgovernancetokensamonga fewinfluentialindividualsoftenunderminesthedecentralizedethosofDAOs, leading to a disparity in decision-making power [24]. These evolving governance structures of DAOspresentacomplexandmultifacetedlandscape,ashighlightedbyseveralresearchers presentingatDAWO24. For example, Saggese et al. [25] emphasize the need to understand how different contributorsandstakeholdersinfluencevotingoutcomesacrossvariousproposalcategories, which is essential for developing more equitable governance structures and achieving the true spirit of decentralization. To advance this understanding, it is important to explorehowtopreventpowercentralization,ensurefairvotingpowerdistribution,balance stakeholderinfluence,andevaluatealternativegovernancemodelslikequadraticvoting. However,implementingquadraticvotingindigitalgovernanceischallenging,particularly intoken-basedsystemswherewealthdisparitiescanskewvotingresults. Toovercomethis, Srinivasanetal.[26]proposeConVo,anenhancedquadraticvotingsystemthatincorporates Sybilresistancethroughbiometrics-basedProof-of-Personhoodandadjustsvoteweight basedonhowlongparticipantsholdtheirconvictions,possiblycreatingafairerandmore manipulation-resistantvotingprocess. Inparallel,Gorzny[27]explorestheintersectionofDAOswithopen-sourcesoftware (OSS)development,highlightingthatwhilebothfieldsvaluetransparencyanddecentral- ization,DAOscouldprovideuniqueadvantagesforOSSprojects. DAOprinciples,suchas decentralizeddecision-makingandincentivizedparticipation,couldenhanceOSSgover- nance,leadingtomoreresilientandcollaborativedevelopmentenvironments. Examining theeffectivenessofDAOgovernanceinOSS,thechallengesofintegratingDAOpractices, andtheimpactoninnovationandscalabilitycouldprovidevaluableinsightsforimproving OSSgovernance. Addressing the vulnerabilities inherent in DAOs, Feichtinger et al. [28] categorize risks,suchasbribery,coalitionattacks,andcodeweaknesses,whichareoftenoverlooked intraditionalaudits. Addressingtheseoverlookedvulnerabilitiesisessentialforensur- ingtheviabilityofDAOs. Furthermore,votingmechanismsinDAOsaresusceptibleto attackslikeSybilattacks. Lenzi’s[29]proposedvotingmechanismaimstocounterthese vulnerabilitiesusingBayesiandesigntopreventunfairadvantagesandmaximizecollective utility. Suggestionsforadditionalcriticalresearchincludevalidatingtheeffectivenessof thismechanismacrossvariousDAOcontexts,exploringitsintegrationwithothersecurity measures,andbalancingdecision-makingefficiencywithsecurity. Further,theauthorsug- gestsapplyingprinciplesfrombehavioraleconomicstocreatemoreresilientgovernance structureswithinDAOs. TheclassificationandcategorizationofDAOproposalspresentanotherimportant challengethatneedstobeaddressed. Therefore,Ziegleretal.[30]havedevelopedaframe- workusingLargeLanguageModels(LLMs)tocategorizeproposalswithhighaccuracy. Thisframeworkenablesautomatedanalysisandlarge-scalestudiesofgovernancetrends. However,refiningthiscategorizationframework,improvingitsgranularity,andincorpo- ratingcontextualfactorsthatmayaffectthesuccessorfailureofproposalscouldoptimize Appl.Sci.2025,15,3491 5of14 proposaldesign,enhancedecision-makingprocesses,andpositivelyinfluencegovernance outcomesaswellascommunityengagementwithinDAOs. Further, strategic voting in DAOs, where participants vote based on anticipated outcomesratherthanpersonalpreferences,underminestheidealofdecentralization,as Rossello[31]reveals. Influentialblockholdersandmajorityvoterscancentralizepowerand manipulateoutcomes,raisingquestionsaboutthetruenatureofdecentralizationinDAOs. AccordingtoRossello[31],ablockholderinaDAOisatokenholderwithsignificantvoting powerwhocanstrategicallyinfluenceoutcomes,oftenbycastingdecisivevotesatcritical moments. Tocounteractthis,itisvitaltoexaminehowblockholdersandothercentralizing forcescompromisedecentralization,exploremechanismstodiscouragestrategicvoting, andassesstheeffectsofsuchvotingonthefinancialstabilityandcommunitytrustwithin DAOs.Todeepenthisapproach,thestudysuggestsexploringthedevelopmentofincentive structuresthatrewardhonestvotingandtoconsideralternativevotingmethodstomaintain balancedinfluenceamongparticipants. Boss[32]providesabroaderperspectivebyexaminingtheheterogeneityingover- nancestructuresamongDAOs,focusingonthedegreesofdecentralization,autonomous functioning,andorganizationalstructure. Thefindingsrevealthatwhilesomecentralizing mechanisms can increase efficiency, they often undermine the democratic principles of DAOs and require safeguards. The study concludes that DAOs should be viewed as a diverselandscaperatherthanasingularorganizationalmodel,whilefurtherresearchcould conductlarge-scalestudiestoexplorethedynamicsofdecentralizationandautonomous functioningacrossdifferentDAOmodelstorefinetheirdefinitionsandgovernanceframe- works. Finally,Allenetal.[33]addressthechallengeofsignalingqualityinapseudony- mous, global environment through the application of costly signaling theory. Effective signalingmechanismsarecrucialforattractingresourcesandtalent,anddistinguishing high-qualityDAOsfromlesscredibleones. Thedevelopmentofrobustsignalingstrategies requirescollectiveactionandmayinvolvenewprotocolsorregulatoryframeworks. They implyupcomingresearchtofocusonidentifyingthemosteffectivesignalingmechanisms forvarioustypesofDAOs,exploringtheimpactofpublicregulationonsignalingprocesses, andunderstandinghowuniquedataandenvironmentalfactorsspecifictoWeb3mightbe leveragedtoenhancesignaling. 3. DevelopingToolsandFrameworksforDAOs TheadvancementofDAOsreliesheavilyonthedevelopmentoftoolsandframeworks thatfacilitateeffectivegovernance,transparency,andscalability[19]. ThisSectionpresents severalkeyareasofresearchfeaturedatDAWO24inthisareaandstructuresthedifferent directionsintoacohesivediscussion,highlightingboththeprogressmadeandthequestions thatremain. CentraltothesuccessofDAOsisthedevelopmentofdemocraticcollaborationtoolsto enhancedecision-makinganddocumentcreationwithinDAOs,ashighlightedbyFinanser andTalmon[34],whoexploremethodslikemetricspaces,iterativevoting,andcoalition formation. These approaches are designed to improve the collaborative capabilities of DAOs,ensuringthatdiverseperspectivesareeffectivelyrepresented. AsDAOscontinueto grow,itiscriticaltoidentifythemosteffectivecollaborationtoolsthatsupporttransparency andinclusivityacrosslargeanddiverseorganizations,whilebalancingconsensus-building withefficiencyandscalability. Further,itisalsoimportanttoexplorenewvotingmethods toincreaseconsensuswithoutcausingdelaysordeadlocks.Thetechnicalinfrastructurethat supportsthedeploymentofEthereum-baseddecentralizedapplications(DApps)within DAOs also demands attention. For this, Fernández-Blanco et al. [35] present an open- sourceframeworkdesignedtoautomateandacceleratethedeploymentofEthereum-based Appl.Sci.2025,15,3491 6of14 decentralizedapplications(DApps),particularlyforscenariosrequiringcustomizedtest environments like DAOs. The framework leverages Docker and bash scripts to create networks of Ethereum and IPFS nodes, simplifying the deployment process toa single command, thereby addressing inefficiencies in current methods. The study concludes thatthistoolsignificantlyreducesthecomplexityandtimerequiredtosetuprealistictest environmentsforDApps. Expandingtheframework’sadaptabilitytoabroaderrangeof use cases, applying it in resource-constrained environments, and further enhancing its scalabilityandintegrationwithotherdecentralizedtechnologiesareimportantdirections topursue. MeasuringautonomywithinDAOspresentsanothersignificantchallenge. Sahmand Giaglis[36]haveintroducedtheAutonomyLevelIndicator(ALI),astandardizedmetric designedtoprovideaclearandconsistentmeasureofautonomy.Thisadvancementaimsto helpresearchersandpractitionersevaluateandcomparedifferentDAOdesigns. However, thecomplexityandinconsistentdefinitionsofautonomyrequirefurtherinvestigationinto themostcriticalaspectstomeasureandhowtoquantifythemeffectively. Additionally, it is necessary to explore whether ALI can be standardized across the industry and to understandtheimpactofdifferentlevelsofautonomyongovernanceoutcomes. IntegratingcomplexityscienceintoDAOframeworksoffersapromisingapproach to addressing inefficiencies andcentralization issues. Ballandies et al.[37] suggest that complexitysciencecanprovidenewperspectivesondecentralizationandemergentprop- erties,potentiallyleadingtomoreeffectiveanddecentralizedsystems. Futureresearch shouldexplorehowprinciplesofcollectiveintelligenceandself-organizationcanbeap- pliedtoDAOdesign,andcriticallyanalyzethepotentialbenefitsandlimitationsofnovel mechanismslikefutarchiesandideamarkets. Understandinghowtheseprinciplesaffect DAOgovernanceandcomparingtheireffectivenesstotraditionalhierarchicalmodelswill be critical for advancing the field. Evaluating the distribution of control within DAOs is another crucial aspect of governance. Papangelou et al. [38] propose a probabilistic frameworkthatincorporatescomplexityandentropyanalysestorefinedecentralization metrics. This approach aims to offer a more precise measure of decentralization, but it requiresfurtherrefinementandvalidation,particularlyforlarge-scaleDAOs. Enhancing thesemetricstoaccountforthecomplexitiesofextensiveDAOsandunderstandingtheir relationshipwithgovernanceoutcomes,aswellastheirabilitytopredictthesuccessor failureofgovernancemodels,arekeyareasforfurtherexploration. Finally, assessingthebusinessvalueandorganizationalstructuresofDAOsiscru- cialforunderstandingtheirpotentialindifferentsectors. KüngandGiaglis[39]offera frameworkforevaluatingthebusinessvalueofDAOsfromanopensystemsperspective, highlightingthechallengesandopportunitiesassociatedwithdifferentDAOstructures. Toensurethelong-termviabilityofDAObusinessstructuresinreal-worldapplications, it will be crucial to investigate the factors that influence stakeholder participation and collaborationinDAOs,categorizedifferentDAObusinessmodels,assesstheirimpacton businessoutcomes,andaddresschallengesrelatedtoscalability,governance,andcommu- nityengagement. 4. AssessingtheValueofDAOs The emergence of DAOs has introduced transformative potential and significant challengeswithinvarioussectors,includingthecreativeandculturalindustries[40],cyber– physical systems (CPS) [41], and blockchain startups [42]. This Section integrates key insights from recent research on DAOs’ impact and potential on value creation, while highlightingcriticalareasforfutureexploration. Appl.Sci.2025,15,3491 7of14 TheresearchbyTenorio-FornésandLupova-Henry[43]emphasizesthatinthecontext ofcreativeandculturalindustries,DAOsnotonlyofferapromisingsolutiontoaddressthe precariousemploymentconditionsfacedbycreativeprofessionalsbutalso,theyhavethe potentialtopromoteeconomicdemocracyandmitigatetheissuesofcentralizedcontrol that are prevalent in traditional platforms. Their advocacy for value-sensitive design approachessuggeststhataligningDAOdesignwiththevaluesofcreativecommunities couldenhancefairnessandinclusivity. However,openresearchquestionspersistregarding howDAOscanbeeffectivelydesignedtomeetthespecificneedsofcreativecommunities, which economic models best support fair compensation, and how DAOs can mitigate theprecariousnatureofworkintraditionalplatforms. Additionally,understandinghow DAOscanfostermeaningfulcommunityengagementandensuresignificantparticipation ingovernanceanddecision-makingremainsanimportantareaforfurtherstudy. Similarly,intherealmofcyber–physicalsystems(CPS),Nabbenetal.[44]explorethe challengesofimplementingdecentralizedgovernancewherephysicalprocessesintersect with digital control systems. Their research highlights the complexities of integrating blockchain technology with CPS, particularly regarding real-time data processing, au- tonomous decision-making, and the alignment with legal and regulatory frameworks. Future research should address how to develop governance models that can adapt to thedynamicrequirementsofCPS,improveresilienceandreliability,andensureeffective decentralizedidentitymanagementandaccesscontrol. Additionally,ethicalconsiderations concerningtheautonomyandaccountabilityofAI-drivenCPSrequirefurtherexploration, especiallyasthesesystemsbecomeintegraltocriticalinfrastructureandpublicservices. Keyquestionsincludeidentifyingthemosteffectivedecentralizedgovernanceframeworks formanagingscalability,security,andreal-timeprocessinginCPS. Shapiro[45]extendsthepotentialofDAOsintotherealmofglobaldigitalgovernance, proposingagrassrootsarchitectureaimedatreplacingcentralizeddigitalplatformswith adecentralizedglobaldemocracy. Theproposedarchitectureincludesablocklace-based protocol stack that supports grassroots platforms, enabling local communities to form digitaleconomiesandexercisesovereigndemocraticgovernance.AccordingtoShapiro[45] ‘blocklace’ is a generalization of the blockchain, designed as a partially-ordered data structurewhereeachblockcanhavemultiplesignedhashpointerstoprecedingblocks, unlikethelinearandsequentialnatureofatraditionalblockchain. Thestudyconcludes that this architecture offers a scalable foundation for a global digital democracy, which couldsignificantlyalterthecurrentdigitallandscapedominatedbycentralizedplatforms. Futureresearchshouldexplorethepracticalimplementationofthisarchitecture,assessits scalability,andinvestigateitsimpactonglobaldigitalgovernance. Inthestartupecosystem,Merk[46]examinesthetrendofstartupstransitioningto DAOs, revealing motivations driven by financial and stewardship objectives. Startups viewDAOstructuresasawaytoimproveownershipandgovernancewhilepreserving existingrights,therebybalancinginnovationwithcontrol. Thistransitionisinfluenced byinternalgoalsandexternalfactors,suchasmarketconditions,legalframeworks,and socialnorms. Futureresearchshouldinvestigatethelong-termeffectsoftransitioningto DAOsonindividualstartupsandthebroaderDAOecosystem. Thisincludesexamining changesingovernancedynamics,theroleofcommunityinvolvement,andtheimpacton investment and talent attraction. Additionally, understanding the legal and regulatory challengesassociatedwiththesetransitionswillbeessentialtoensurethatmovingtoa DAOisbothsustainableandbeneficial. Finally,Oarda[47]introducestheconceptofOptimalSmartContractsasasolution totheprincipal–agentproblemineconomictransactions,utilizingAI-drivenOraclesand blockchaintechnologywithinDAOs. Thisapproachpromisestoincreasetransparencyand Appl.Sci.2025,15,3491 8of14 trust,potentiallyleadingtoParetooptimalityacrossindustries. However,thefeasibility andbroaderadoptionofthesecontractsinreal-worldscenariosrequirefurthervalidation, particularlyinhowDAOscanfacilitatetheirwidespreaduse. 5. ExploringLegalandRegulatoryDimensionsofDAOs ThelegalstatusandrecognitionofDAOsremainsasignificantchallenge,asjurisdic- tionsaroundtheworldstruggletoestablishappropriateregulationsfortheseentities[12]. ThislackofclearlegalframeworkscomplicatestheoperationofDAOs,especiallywhen theyfunctionacrossdifferentcountries[48,49]. TheaspectoflegalrecognitionofDAOsissubjecttomanystudiesanddiscussions andthereareseveralapproaches. TheevolvinglandscapeoflegalframeworksforDAOs hasgarneredsignificantattentionacrossvariousjurisdictions,ashighlightedbyPietrowska etal.[50]intheircomprehensiveanalysisoflegalstructuresinSwitzerland,Liechtenstein, andtheUAE.Theirresearchrevealsthateachjurisdictionoffersdistinctadvantagesand challenges, providingspecificrecommendationsforlegalentities, suchasAssociations, Cooperatives,andFoundationsbasedonDAOobjectives.Understandingtheseframeworks iscriticalforensuringcomplianceandoperationalsuccessinadecentralizedenvironment. Thereisaneedtoexpandthisanalysistootherregionsandassessthelong-termimplications oflegalchoicesonthedevelopmentofDAOs. In Turkey, the lack of specific DAO regulations has led Karadeniz [51] to propose theapplicationofgeneralpartnershiprulesunderTurkishlaw,whilealsosuggestingthat theAssociationcouldserveasatemporarysolutionuntilmoresuitableregulationsare established. Similarly,Schillig[52]arguesforthecreationofanewlegaltheorytailored specificallytoDAOs,onethatbuildsonexistingcorporatelawbutaddressestheunique characteristicsoftheseorganizations. Theseresultsshowthatthereisacriticaldiscussion aboutwhethernewlegalformsarenecessaryfortherecognitionofDAOsoriftheexisting legalstructuressuffice. ThecurrentlegalframeworksurroundingDAOsisstillevolving, particularlyregardingliability. Traditionalliabilitymechanismsmaynotfullyaddressthe complexitiesinherentinDAOs,suchasdecentralizedgovernance,participantanonymity, andautomateddecision-makingthroughsmartcontracts. NapieralskaandKe˛pczyn´ski[53] haveexaminedhowthesetraditionalmechanismsmightbeadaptedtofitthedecentralized natureofDAOs. Theyemphasizetheimportanceofidentifyingauthorityandcontrolin DAOstoassignresponsibilityanddetermineliability. However,thismightbecomplex, andtheareaisstillevolving. Their research underscorestheneed fornewlegalframe- workscapableofhandlingthesecomplexitieswhileprotectingbothDAOparticipantsand externalparties. Furthermore,thereisaneedtoaddresscriminalandadministrativeresponsibilities within these frameworks. In addition to liability concerns, blockchain-based dispute resolution(BBDR)platformsalsofaceregulatorychallenges,andKamalova’s[54]research emphasizestheimportanceofaligningBBDRplatformswithexistinglegalstandardsto boostuserconfidenceandensureenforceability. Designinglegalframeworksthatintegrate theseplatformsintoestablishedsystemsiscrucial,withkeyareasforexploration,including theimpactoflegalstructuresonDAOgovernance,adaptinglegaltheoriestoaccommodate DAOs,andensuringBBDRplatformsmeetregulatoryrequirements. 6. DiscussionandFutureDirections BasedonthepapersanddiscussionspresentedatDAWO24wecouldidentify(i)Ana- lyzingGovernanceMechanisms,(ii)DevelopingToolsandFrameworks,(iii)Assessingthe Valueand(iv)ExploringLegalandRegulatoryDimensionsasthefourmaintrendsinDAO

Appl.Sci.2025,15,3491 9of14 Appl. Sci. 2025, 15, 3491 9 of 14 research. AssummarizedinFigure1eachtrendhasauniqueresearchfocusandcomes withspecificfutureresearchdirections. DAO Research Trends Research Focus Future Reserach Directions Power Distribution: Balancing stakeholder influence and preventing centralization. • Exploring ways to prevent power concentration. Analyzing Governance Voting Mechanism: Exploring novel voting mechanisms • Advancing fair and inclusive voting systems. Mechanisms like quadratic voting. • Researching methods to prevent security concerns. Security Concerns: Addressing vulnerabilities like bribery and coalition attacks. Collaboration Tools: Enhancing democratic decision- making and document creation. • Create tools to manage DAO complexity and growth. Developing Tools and Deployment Frameworks: Automating setup and key • Enhancing accessibility with intuitive design. Frameworks functions of Ethereum-based decentralized applications. • Investigating new tools to automate and streamline DAO Measuring DAOs: Developing standardized metrics for functions. evaluating DAO performance and autonomy. Transformation: Enhancing efficiency and innovation across industries. • Tailoring DAOs for industry-specific needs. Integration: Integrating with existing systems to enable Assessing the Value • Enabling integration with complex org. systems. decentralization and create shared value. • Promoting equitable value distribution and sustainability. Empowerment: Addressing precarious employment and promote economic democracy. Jurisdictional Challenges: Analyzing the legal status and challenges of DAOs across jurisdictions. • Developing legal structures for DAOs. Exploring Legal and Liability Concerns: Addressing complexities of • Exploring regional recognition and consistency. Regulatory Dimensions decentralized governance and anonymity. • Collaborating with policymakers to address ambiguities. Dispute Resolution: Integrating blockchain-based platforms with existing legal systems. Figure 1. Trends, focus aFnigdu freu1tu.Trree nddisr,efcoctiuosnans dinfu DtuAreOdi rreectsioenasrcinhD. AOresearch. By examining the research around the emerging trend of Analyzing Governance By examining theM reecsheaanricsmh awreocuanndid ethnteif yemwoerrkgoinngm torreeneqdu oitfa bAlenaanldydzeincegn tGraolivzeedrndeacniscioen M-meackhin-g anism we can identifpyr owceossreks [o2n5, 3m1,3o2]r,et heeqiuntietgarbalteio nanofdi ndneocveatnivteravloiztiendg mdeecchiasnioisnm-sm[2a6k,2i9n],ga npdroth-e explorationofhowDAOscanenhancecollaborativeeffortsindiverseareas,suchasopen- cesses [25,31,32], the integration of innovative voting mechanisms [26,29], and the explora- sourcedevelopment[27]. Inaddition,thereisagrowingfocusondevelopingstrategies tion of how DAOs can enhance collaborative efforts in diverse areas, such as open-source tostrengthentheintegrityandtransparencyofDAOs[30,33],ensuringthattheyremain development [27]. Int ruaedtdoitthioeinr,d etcheenrtrea liizse dap rginrcoipwleisnwg hifloeceuffse ctoivne lydaedvderleosspininggch asltlreangteesg,iesusc htoa s concentrationofpowerandsecurityrisks[25,28]. Inrespecttofutureresearchdirections, strengthen the integrity and transparency of DAOs [30,33], ensuring that they remain true wecanadvocatethatthereisagrowingneedonexploringnewmechanismstoprevent to their decentralized principles while effectively addressing challenges, such as concentra- power concentration and enhance security. This involves developing advanced voting tion of power and secusyrsitteym rsitshkats e[n2s5u,r2e8fa].ir Innes rseasnpdeincctl utosi vfiutyt,ualrleo wreinsgeaalrlcphar tdiciirpeacnttisotonsh,a vweea nceaqnu iatadb-le sayindecision-makingprocesses.Additionally,researchersshouldfocusonidentifyingand vocate that there is a growing need on exploring new mechanisms to prevent power con- mitigatingvulnerabilities,suchasbriberyandcoalitionattacks,tosafeguardtheintegrity centration and enhance security. This involves developing advanced voting systems that of these decentralized systems. By addressing these critical areas, the goal is to create ensure fairness and incmluorseivroibtuys,t aalnldowresiinligen atlDl ApOasrttihcaitpuapnhotsld ttoh ehiradveec eanntr aelqizueditparbinleci psaleys winh idleeecffiescitoivne-ly making processes. Addmiatnioagninagllpyo, treenstieaalrricshkse.rs should focus on identifying and mitigating vul- ThesecondcurrenttrendintheDAOresearchaboutDevelopingToolsandFrame- nerabilities, such as bribery and coalition attacks, to safeguard the integrity of these decen- worksemphasizesenhancingcollaborativedecision-makingprocesses[34],automatingkey tralized systems. By afdundcrtieosnssi[n3g5] ,tahnedsees tacbrliitsihcianlg astraenadsa,r dtihzeed gmoeatrli cisst otobe cttreeraevteal umatoerDeA rOopbeurfsotr manandce resilient DAOs that upahnodladu ttohneoimr yd[e3c6e,3n8t].rAaldizdietido nparlliyn,cthiperleeiss waghroilwei negffienctetirvesetliyn imntaegnraatgininggco pmoptleexni-ty tial risks. The second current trend in the DAO research about Developing Tools and Frame- works emphasizes enhancing collaborative decision-making processes [34], automating key functions [35], and establishing standardized metrics to better evaluate DAO performance and autonomy [36,38]. Additionally, there is a growing interest in integrating complexity science [37] and assessing the business value of DAOs to ensure they can effectively operate and scale in diverse real-world applications [39]. For the future direction, we recommend a concentrated effort on developing tools and frameworks that are capable of handling growth and increased complexity. This includes designing intuitive interfaces and processes to improve accessibility and usability for DAO members, ensuring that participation is straightforward and user-friendly. Additionally, researchers should investigate new tools and frameworks to further automate and streamline DAO functions, aiming to enhance ef- ficiency and scalability. By addressing these areas, the objective is to create more robust and user-centric DAOs that can effectively manage their evolving needs and challenges. Appl.Sci.2025,15,3491 10of14 science[37]andassessingthebusinessvalueofDAOstoensuretheycaneffectivelyoperate andscaleindiversereal-worldapplications[39]. Forthefuturedirection,werecommend aconcentratedeffortondevelopingtoolsandframeworksthatarecapableofhandling growthandincreasedcomplexity. Thisincludesdesigningintuitiveinterfacesandpro- cessestoimproveaccessibilityandusabilityforDAOmembers,ensuringthatparticipation isstraightforwardanduser-friendly. Additionally,researchersshouldinvestigatenewtools andframeworkstofurtherautomateandstreamlineDAOfunctions,aimingtoenhance efficiencyandscalability. Byaddressingtheseareas,theobjectiveistocreatemorerobust anduser-centricDAOsthatcaneffectivelymanagetheirevolvingneedsandchallenges. TheresearchonAssessingtheValueofDAOanalyzedinthisarticlehighlightsthe transformative potential of DAOs across various sectors, from creative industries [43] to cyber–physical systems [44] and startups [46], while also underscoring the need for optimizedgovernanceframeworks,theintegrationofblockchaintechnologywithexist- ingsystems,andtheexplorationofneweconomicmodelsthatalignwithdecentralized principles[45,47]. Futureresearchisessentialtoaddressthesechallenges,focusingonthe practicalimplementationofDAOs,theirimpactonindustrydynamics,andthelegaland regulatoryimplicationsoftheirwidespreadadoption. ForfurtherdevelopmentofDAOs itwillbecrucialtocreatetailoreddesignsthataddresstheuniquerequirementsofdiffer- entindustries. ThisinvolvesensuringthatDAOscanintegrateeffectivelywithexisting andcomplexorganizationalsystems,facilitatingseamlesscollaborationandfunctionality. Additionally, there is a focus on developing mechanisms that promote equitable value distributionandsustainableeconomics,ensuringthatallparticipantsbenefitfairlyfrom theDAO’soperations. Byaddressingtheseaspects,theaimistodesignDAOsthatare adaptable,efficient,andcapableofmeetingthediverseneedsofvarioussectors. InsummarizingtheresearchtrendofExploringLegalandRegulatoryDimensions, itbecomesevidentthatthelegalstatusofDAOscontinuestobeasignificantchallenge forjurisdictionsaroundtheworld[50–54]. ThecomplexityofDAOoperations,especially across borders, highlights the urgent need for tailored legal frameworks that address theuniquecharacteristicsofdecentralizedgovernance,participantanonymity,andsmart contract automation [52,53]. Research underscores the importance of developing legal structuresthatensurecompliance,protectstakeholders,andintegrateinnovativedispute resolutionmechanisms,allwhileaccommodatingtheevolvingnatureofDAOswithinthe globallegallandscape[51,54]. Inthefuture,itwillremainessentialtoresearchcohesive legalstructuresforDAOsthataddresstheiruniquecharacteristics. Thisincludesexploring mechanisms to ensure DAOs are recognized and operate consistently across different regions, facilitating smoother cross-border interactions. Additionally, there is a need tocollaboratewithpolicymakersandlegalexpertstonavigateandresolveambiguities, ensuring that DAOs can function within clear and supportive legal frameworks. By focusingontheseareas,thegoalistocreateastableandlegallysoundenvironmentfor DAOstothriveglobally. 7. Conclusions ThefirstEuropeanDAOWorkshop2024hasbeenimportantinadvancingourun- derstandingofDecentralizedAutonomousOrganizationsandhighlightingcurrenttrends inDAOresearch. ThediscussionsatDAWO24identifiedseveralkeyareascriticaltothe continuedevolutionofDAOs,revealingbothsignificantprogressandimportantgapsthat requirefurtherattentionfromtheresearchcommunity. Throughsystematicmeta-analysis oftheworkshopcontributions,weidentifiedfourcriticalresearchstreamsthatareshaping thefutureofDAOs: governancemechanisms,technicalframeworks,valueassessment,and legaldimensions. Appl.Sci.2025,15,3491 11of14 OneofthecentralthemesatDAWO24wastheanalysisofgovernancemechanisms withinDAOs. Theworkshopemphasizedtheneedforrobustgovernanceframeworksthat balancepower,ensuretransparency,andeffectivelyresolveconflicts,therebymaintaining inclusivityandfairnesswithinDAOs. Furthermore,participantsatDAWO24underscored the need for scalable, secure, and user-friendly technical frameworks that support the deploymentofdecentralizedapplications(DApps)andimprovetheoverallfunctionality andsustainabilityofDAOs. TheevaluationofthevaluethatDAOsbringtobothpartici- pantsandsocietyatlargewasalsoacriticaltopicofdiscussion. Currentresearchshows promisingapplicationsacrossvarioussectors,fromcreativeindustriestocyber–physical systems,thoughstandardizedevaluationmethodsremainunderdeveloped. Finally,the workshopexploredthelegalandregulatorydimensionsofDAOs. DAWO24participants delved into the potential for legal recognition of DAOs and discussed how regulatory frameworkscouldbeadaptedtofosterinnovationwhileensuringstakeholderprotection. Whiletheworkshopprovidedvaluableinsights,itisimportanttoacknowledgecertain limitations in its scope. The conference primarily focused on organizational structures, which,whilevaluable,meantthatcertaincrucialaspectsoftheDAOecosystemreceivedless attention.TechnicalaspectsofDAOimplementationanddevelopmentwerenotextensively covered,anddiscussionsaroundfinancialimplications,suchasthedisruptionoftraditional financesystemsandemergingfinancialmodels,werelimited. Additionally,thisreviewis limitedinscopeasitexclusivelysynthesizesresearchpresentedatDAWO24,ratherthan incorporatingabroadersystematicreviewofDAOliterature. Asaresult,relevantthemes anddebates from outsidethis workshopmaynot befully captured, such asthe roleof DAOsinregulatorycompliance,casestudiesoffailedDAOs,theintersectionofartificial intelligencewithDAOgovernance,orcomparativeanalyseswithtraditionalcooperative models. Theselimitationsreflectthenaturalconstraintsofanyfocusedacademicgathering, butalsohighlightopportunitiesforfutureworkshopstobroadentheirscope. Lookingforward,ourreviewpointstoseveralcrucialresearchdirectionsthatrequire immediateattention. Futureresearchmustfocusondevelopinggovernancemechanisms thatcaneffectivelyscalewhilemaintainingdecentralizationprinciples,alongsidecreating standardizedframeworksformeasuringDAOperformanceandsocietalimpact. Addi- tionally, researchers need to investigate technical solutions that balance security with accessibility,whileworkingtowardtheestablishmentofcomprehensivelegalframeworks for cross-jurisdictional DAO operations. These interconnected challenges highlight the complexityofadvancingDAOresearchandunderscoretheneedforcoordinatedefforts acrossmultipledisciplines. Furthermore,thefindingsofthisreviewprovideafoundation forfutureworkthatcanaddresspracticalimplicationsforpolicymakers,industryleaders, anddevelopers,contributingtoadeeperunderstandingofhowDAOscaninfluencepolicy, industrypractices,anddevelopmentstrategies. Insummary,thediscussionsatDAWO24underscoredtheneedforfurtherresearch andinnovationinDAO-relatedareas,particularlyemphasizingtheimportanceofinter- disciplinary research. Given that DAOs are inherently interdisciplinary, the European DAOWorkshop2024andthisarticleaimedtopromotecross-disciplinarycollaboration to advance DAO research. For the future direction of DAO research, interdisciplinary collaborationiscrucialtoaddressthecomplexchallengesDAOsface. AuthorContributions:Conceptualization,M.L.andF.S.;validation,L.K.,E.B.andS.W.;writing— originaldraftpreparation,M.L.;writing—reviewandediting,M.L.,F.S.,L.K.,E.B.andS.W.;visualiza- tion,M.L.andL.K.;projectadministration,M.L.Allauthorshavereadandagreedtothepublished versionofthemanuscript. Funding:TheAPCwasfundedbyZHAWZurichUniversityofAppliedSciences. Appl.Sci.2025,15,3491 12of14 Acknowledgments:TheauthorswouldliketoacknowledgetheassistanceprovidedbyOpenAI’s ChatGPT4.0insummarizingthecontributionspresentedattheDAWO24andimprovingthequality of this article through language editing. The tool was instrumental in refining the clarity and coherenceofthemanuscript.However,allinterpretations,conclusions,andanyerrorsremainthe responsibilityoftheauthors. ConflictsofInterest:Theauthorsdeclarenoconflictsofinterest. References 1. 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