Gov-Acc Pipeline.

- Pdf link: - Values in Governance Technology - Liz Barry, Joseph Gubbels. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5ea874746663b45e14a384a4/t/68011b380d60e07bff674a53/1744903889700/Values+in+Governance+Technology - Online Governance Surfaces and Attention Economies - Nathan Schneider, Kelsie Nabben, Ronen Tamari, Michael Zargham, https://osf.io/preprints/mediarxiv/cdrmp_v1 - [Community Currencies: The Price Of Attention And Cost Of Influence In A Networked Age -or- The Price Of Entry And Cost Of Exit In A Networked Age ](https://download.ssrn.com/2025/2/13/5136037.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEP%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJIMEYCIQCvWYT%2FW3HHbNrnwqsdYgTocmjrJiGhewcSvGvXInVs8QIhAJyqhFeBDIKRwGQnf3d1IVhB983kW7lm5f8DAHmiRljbKsYFCMf%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEQBBoMMzA4NDc1MzAxMjU3Igxskg0DlGX5yLbUP2AqmgW%2BfTUOMUuGa1Hb2QgyKCW0XwXa0u4nBuxSggeLaDN7K19nXjNAP99mOhpcOLrbctIdFb3cTiIxd5qdOPrushT%2B05oNF94JKb9BObT7MBvg6Ltot0gWekYXcoYz6yEFtxpJDR1bLn3RTCNHEWgeuf7%2FhNO%2BOpS171QLvHsoQcWxEMBZ4Gqujw3eTXSvUGLhL2dlO6NvEb1bHx1YzFGbcu6lgUEK2%2BXBa%2B95VdwDQAnmQZA3vDWAB%2BbfPPWsazoZaIWuhliHAsw4TFaUHa6%2Floy2NKhuSSNwP3vkpDHUZ6HEXpwE18rSpXT%2BabKFVgCHGNKE3EZFU6LJPWXAu64AV0RMMe5VskDEAbiw4vhx%2BHU6avzVpQp56gsaFZXRIyK%2Bxbqe4Tev%2FeFmMCIoAkkrKB5iXlD0TdSEKioKbtgSis1xRujQkLtr9v3V15MNL5j7WMh1ZVQ%2F8ZZQsRQt3S2HDvz4WB3FmnouoGSqsJPkkhKWLXAy8Erij2MJ%2FMEL7XVfd261rOHS2AG26lYsrZK3lvgmAs5E9EerteCCj%2BgSTEcxsdZG8UTN%2F8kV4X2ofHo2GcD2UHsDyWf4mp7sUzznQTY9bntZZbeiyRp5CFlqUy%2BJ%2FfkmbNz6Gv7ViYb5igRiThs2P280IwcZwcOBNZkUm%2FpRSdRjquUtAyhDfTEwLVjO1sBzBTkfDP%2BJrkVnrNIYXRBK2j6bvwH%2F3EvMg6y%2FfnIT5T9k1Cu1kExGSY20Gtw%2BjPHwlqGhX7czO9Q0fwQdTJE0ZG%2BxinYYZFpL0pmsBeGyxeE2KI77zP9cxAIKR1VBERFRbYQzTIDg6%2BK5ozW8%2BlYFZtPJxo1U0STAJw3fVtgRxiODVYzqcvR9HZg5LuVp0BOqI92C%2Fc6PU0kw4uHczQY6sAEC5WleTxqC9HHu42OY6eMCcO5wHY9pNWxzlyLJ3MP6uRvC0wZJp19e%2B3wnnFHh3Au6DbYdLkPfrRI0YpWUIlDbOkBLTW233HK8MG1uk0U82vcr5YE7znpOws01z9GHIPFSC9AbcNoVB6uT6YvaAJvgjvoEjhejrthXudl4YSvtYMmil5M2BQMCHzQWnwUwSRyO%2FFnXtGPrcXxBQxhAvd3%2BxG%2BRrSK8zHQLDjsSYI98DQ%3D%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20260315T224927Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWETQNM4PPT%2F20260315%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=8ac0bdd8ee9e0403d1286045a2dca02f37b4bb54106fae8a021607b6458994b8&abstractId=5136037) Computational Jury Systeem and appeals are of nite: "In Olhahver’s paper on community currencies, jurors are not external arbiters but are drawn from multiple overlapping communities where the disputes originate. Voting power is adjusted to prioritize diverse perspectives over concentrated influence. When a decision is challenged, the appeal process triggers a multi-tiered review, with each successive tier requiring a jury composed of informationally distinct members. This structure reduces the risk of coordinated manipulation or factional bias. The approach aligns with PCARE’s proposal of leveraging plurality and subsidiarity to ensure that governance decisions reflect the collective intelligence of diverse participants rather than being dominated by concentrated interests." - [Decentralized Autonomous Organizations For Governance And Operations](https://ijcrt.org/papers/IJCRT2506799.pdf) Abstract: Cryptographic ledger technologies have catalyzed a paradigm shift in democratic participation models, unlocking transformative approaches to deconstruct conventional institutional power structures. This investigation presents a pioneering computational framework for developing autonomous collective entities that exploit Solana's high-velocity transaction processing and economically efficient execution environment. Contemporary organizational governance suffers from systemic inefficiencies rooted in bureaucratic centralization and costly operational friction. Our engineered approach deploys a dual-tier computational infrastructure that elegantly synthesizes immutable cryptographic protocols with adaptive collaborative mechanisms operating beyond the blockchain boundary. The underlying consensus layer employs programmable smart contracts constructed via the Anchor development toolkit, codifying irrevocable governance statutes, proportional influence allocation systems, and autonomous financial management protocols. The interaction framework, developed using React.js with sophisticated state coordination and cryptocurrency wallet compatibility, establishes an intuitive ecosystem for stakeholder engagement encompassing initiative formulation, democratic deliberation, and perpetual administrative transparency Comprehensive verification methodologies—spanning microscopic contract logic auditing, complete wallet communication pathway testing, and cross-system data integrity confirmation—demonstrate that our implementation surpasses established industry standards for cryptographic robustness, distributed system performance, and interface usability metrics. - [Voting governance and value creation in decentralized autonomous organizations](https://pdf.sciencedirectassets.com/311970/1-s2.0-S2352673424X00037/1-s2.0-S2352673425000241/main.pdf?X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEHoaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJIMEYCIQDtJ41AA9L2qXrOT%2BN00qKokWdQ3cWiWYHoNvGtcy%2Fm2AIhANcJxPYPH%2FWPLPjbpM1XCr7mPw3efo1OiiA7B8OPdntWKrIFCEMQBRoMMDU5MDAzNTQ2ODY1Igzx4FZmJXQwJZFS3acqjwXqIhqkg1cDIKrdi%2BXD%2B13%2BGryaHpnpEnhyfdUV0k4WK6iU%2FEfVoi1GjUUSco9dCld7UHogWUHn6EMa%2B7iUW6c3CP%2FUX8TtNlF5De47a3Xjsuld3MnX6QXD0RN49PxuTBpHiJ1hj6am90tkzC8ZIcGG8lXHRsynyU%2FKi4TNYjZiHRjfbwUQeqfwAN0uePxLR8CxuFdE%2BoPemfWuiIjbcOGxthmLdh%2FHDXydZxA%2BpWNP1rxpOCVY6meVbvVddtWzIfMuj%2BNfJoaKecQY0g9kBpNPWDNBzRNaJXV41azdktyKwYLAxYig%2FY7IaL7HrAvUzLjTKSWqSU4ECwSelMXHTTy%2Fsn%2BQ2iIE3ru7liVrrx%2Fqi5pQUccz1Jdz48pWdga7t8zt9Z2u9scsXc7NnbJJXQa1RuRthNd1zNMx5OgBuccD1pkW4DknHOAgLtYvNouU7FjQeebWi9ASOYXUjLIcNh428XWJqjvHH1b297ujRKjxVC4xrM0SFkafLEijSepu2R5W8DNzqQaUYWuvPJYEEiE8I7laB1UfVmKnBc8Wme8IrnLpYDUK%2F%2FhUHSEE6nmzofATLVNUUW%2FFUa%2FMlRR9kSKDcfcHQPIcW3oqQ9n03mvvfROL32RzfYGusNIWtoBnbnw0izxmk4JO7uxl%2B%2FeWf6ORRYHmq299rKI98GF7b9t9CyhrQmim6bMAggR5WdrBnSYkDg6M6Gb1n15W9Q4W5H%2FJNabQJhtmJBjm8gz8CYqYwvQFkuvO65A%2FhiHAuNnIk8PfgW7U50XGW6uQH%2F6HgBICoD%2B%2FSdiwnB%2F6ln7I6IxLvzWBacXbQ5SnAlPqmBD9sLcXiZPeBWB1YUM3bS2qgjnmCgFoMLmybzE0jbihVDY8MJns980GOrABhN%2Bmd0ryrfo4HkFUP1ehU38ESi8UteFUepLx7yP6tlWWezS%2FamnhmecNAMMTjWpc7Sa3kGuVfakHe4zFe508TchuVKEe1mrL729SNRbjjGWy2EkQCbXchi8Ki5%2Bgq1mRSu4XLt%2BHFk2BQoR0ZiJIf4sfs2Csa1mlXV7ut0%2FsJOuUszcx%2FG%2Bk4AsQ1yVBkLhK1wWKy1T6%2FyuqjQ0lROtwVP358ypo1FV%2FFOokmriSkfs%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20260321T022903Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAQ3PHCVTYR2K3QDPY%2F20260321%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=1487e7174aef92694fb2e6c937505a6574b000496cfc3bb557bc184f1ba6a8cb&hash=6224a253adbb7ea411a04d1f0c147ff5ad6905d1f10491221aa04201da6bf01c&host=68042c943591013ac2b2430a89b270f6af2c76d8dfd086a07176afe7c76c2c61&pii=S2352673425000241&tid=spdf-403967e3-237c-4848-9bd7-755356addb44&sid=4a014fea55b256444c399ef3e654ac6f5eeagxrqa&type=client&tsoh=d3d3LnNjaWVuY2VkaXJlY3QuY29t&rh=d3d3LnNjaWVuY2VkaXJlY3QuY29t&ua=0f155701025a565804555b&rr=9df986d59ee5f788&cc=us) Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) crowdfunds to invest in various projects. The decentralization feature of DAOs submits that decision-making is a collective democratic action of all DAO members. The autonomy feature of DAOs suggests that decision-making is an algorithmic process governed by self-executing smart contracts. However, in reality, DAOs are neither perfectly decentralized nor completely autonomous. Our empirical analysis shows that deviations from the ideals of decentralization and autonomy are costly. Non-algorithmic off- chain voting governance of decision-making leads to a substantial discount in DAO value. Non-decentralized aspects such as large voting coalitions also affect DAO value. Interaction effects are also shown. The study implies that platform governance design choices are crucial for DAO success. - [DAO Governance: Decentralized But Not So Disorganized](https://download.ssrn.com/2026/1/12/6065407.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEHsaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIAFrU8w7Ui0QUSdx8uajB%2FOOcroqK8PUzJALByPVCDTnAiB9X2nc8tghplW7xOevSriJq734kHkpDt1iy193%2BpLRTCq9BQhDEAQaDDMwODQ3NTMwMTI1NyIMXtqOFmITVIJCyLIgKpoFD1eT3U%2BypJBQP86u7xTJl2HbTL81bBUIW1bom8ZLTsTKlQxC1N2DEEx%2FmqZXttZdN2aFhn74e4xiHjhLg9RQehrn9pXXq0HQ0UlhBRgEUDNiM302IZpujr5Mdb3pzJeOTex6d3RwWyxGMabsqptUk2nmSRP3ELlihsSZtKYDEduuYhVzuK4mCmneDV4J7KiFE8ZbamiTx9LMfH%2BByp%2BVyCtc%2FPlV3QHo4BWWv92D0b4DNiTA2AcjCC0%2BKy4dD1ZpqwDCi0onYaenwfSvYFyxZobVAP3nUnJsh13RflusNpn5Fq7fDYn2aAF51jH4EgYgylQTgdXWZzuAe%2BTCq4kWn8N13FLYNb5%2BAuPWfeCOFIoX2sdGbHXZVdRL%2BXGapx2TkQuyi7BchoEFgeI2l8nBkl4yyv2FmWXWfO%2FGrQZNCvXCk03bIM7SVb7x%2Fjms8ltwPHyPfS9na%2BJiVk5SqXW6%2Fs%2F29uiBtwDhnaZ4FJuJtkspFZY19GjgIFYVZfuyvdexyLXtTmMsxogES%2F4zbgl4C0wqlzeFlqhr3GfRIGR2%2Fq2sbEIIN9r8A%2F2kdloLFWEdPikn2dSx0OFEGj0dnD8hUTv370BOlJY9QY8As%2BUqCWL7CaZirnAP2TGoOtV4gaeS%2FKKN4XHVeSHWbVTfzjoIH0I5kRXBiICvNzidfIuuXYMaMsoxCDgW4IGeOMKmux0G4aUSYID9MQrHRJUT3UZaSlIMA%2BIUYaaH1aYT7PxA9XzslJHnEUxQyxmOGhVHdoPtA8Tub%2BgvwW1f3Uy0%2F3fBm8OIbWr4Unmwii0CV3lXWptJZE3QnDaRHTHB93o6qmWtDcLTC4dcJZ9HR3MxBx%2F3zJ7XWy8Z8l%2FTh77ySDHM0V9Z0%2BYP6VK5yRiJMN36980GOrIB3gXFqT6iBPyRum%2FYXaXLllOgVfXTOtujmJ2FDxasGvq59ok3F8RFc5X4nGnLf5D9AwO7wfyTgSaunB%2BIxadM5cbJLs1rvTn4LBpSSSz9gWnlL%2F%2F%2FHUIEkY2XKuAqSRo3iLKoj24ZAINg1z4kPcuL7BD9Hoj7ZV%2FyLJO2PTsTdkBinHeRKk7Ko4NJvIOUhpXYMIyS%2Bm8uTkjgrOfb%2F5BhHaWVtSuBjRGHi2CGcP2WkHqsSg%3D%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20260321T023504Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWEQDZS746A%2F20260321%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=30cb61f79682cf976a2e871785e391d34157a7602c946195914e362356cdb51f&abstractId=6065407) Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) promise a new model of collective governance, replacing managerial hierarchies with token-holder participation. Yet decentralization alone does not guarantee effective decision-making. This chapter examines how real-world DAOs structure governance to balance openness, security, and accountability. Drawing on evidence from leading DAOs, we show that successful governance hinges on thoughtful design rather than maximal decentralization. Inclusive participation, well-calibrated constraints, and security mechanisms can reinforce rather than undermine collective decision-making. We translate these insights into practical guidance for DAO builders, contributors, and policymakers, highlighting governance features that foster engagement, mitigate agency problems, and support sustainable growth in decentralized organizations. - [Control of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations](https://download.ssrn.com/23/01/12/ssrn_id4322917_code1336273.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEHoaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJIMEYCIQDDwgLmpKfLQnKgLLuPyy%2BLvNVQbiB%2FOQbp18PaSUXzQwIhAMg39htxHr4IRV3ryLcIdxlWlk6GNDuqISPFIlS%2B%2FNTuKr0FCEMQBBoMMzA4NDc1MzAxMjU3IgxTc5XhIdGKWlCHU78qmgW6bild0iFGqWY2FhilZCMB0I1f3PQUvYIUONawk%2Fg8IsWnebwDU4%2FGj%2B0mPK9PfX10duYxCSOUrm7Ccgs7fm%2BEHGeSMIJuhqs4n9f4QfqPSwplHA55H9whdnzKqUdZKwUvGWwaXrJ6m21R9FCxZGfo2KqqVjNRuKT%2FK%2FLNdfBLLjOcgnwP8HTtO48wtafOyWHLQGcol%2B3ZsYBk22TPdFCivhmT72ZXWmA99RmRvaz6WZ1w4pQUF%2BjDkrpyMlR091EozLUFbwak6qzxUeuY2zGzDjHfmjAZcYrtomXwMJfpxbYiDPS%2FZ6n6YI%2FY9w7fqfOd%2FiQE2X%2FgT4N90RtlDKVb9btj%2BQT3wrp5DeNW%2B7Vv4714pHrki3kJb%2FIqkrwnFZgGn2Ue%2FGnJwG6dYZ3J6JNJB8%2BmX2qk2RQwCsQFfdlh8%2F6vBFNIat%2BI8JGB61MGIzueGtGh8qgRwLf%2F4D%2BXRme202mYLwFsl2OK0qCblaTLy4jdc5D1kN8PAL2Ka%2BbpF8tNiJnY8AXqvd5IotTW0nxWVVq2qZa8DU9NA4FREi2PhZcW2JettlWX2VvblA%2FLuLcOxzQfG2lfM2yOXoOwmMLA2J1vzKHFr4Eeo4OgW%2FcziLYEYSXC0vtr274tGdz6KjbveVhsUithPMlmTt9wlVSnV7N8hEZu3tB9zl%2B3AjgSJaRtRuaJxZMMt5oDXsTLY56AKNte%2FGPowunPtqX3%2BhuoefarGdg%2Fz%2F2zqonmobb3VvcC3zHj5xgaxu29nWMdOS3Rq8wEwckmpwLWq0x20ar5SLEt83IeHKwiB60Cvk7htawYCEFxTXHpjOEfN1Vzw1UdXMnfJQ9PL0ozR1TTerJxxOP1hiC51BgsoDfqd6%2FIUPmwiIcGDyzkIfow5%2Bv3zQY6sAGHpJLFP7BXkmMKESIg1gPO7LPSq%2F2%2Fw8ilAjWP60Pems0RBFbI1SvXkYn6M2UFPm6C32aOkhWlgEojFVl49bwtBUz6G6pGj9pMbEvhjN3QR7zEsKKvyxdmwoMhS46VNAe7sYg4IWLD%2F1WSAEL2R%2F7%2FoJl95r4F6hUkkDYY6TaNwnbuySr%2FPujTac2gPe%2FXpVNj4IQlFcYeaAgiGa%2BDpm2QS%2BNpYoI5TZKjehMjrJwp6g%3D%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20260321T023858Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWETIFIOXDW%2F20260321%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=e2889d56fba61637404f6e04a0c12e3c17d1e0cd68d9f0db8df03321d534ff5a&abstractId=4322917) Blockchain technology has facilitated the emergence of a new type of organizational form, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs). In contrast to corporations and other types of business organizations, DAOs do not have managers or directors with formal decision rights. Instead, the members of DAOs collectively make decisions by voting on proposals. The governance process is encoded and executed via a smart contract, negating the need for centralized leadership. We examine the control of DAOs by analyzing 10,639 proposals across 151 DAOs. We find that, rather than democratizing decision-making, a small number, often three or fewer, of entities exert control over most decisions - [DAO Governance: Voting Power, Participation, and Controversy - A Review and an Empirical Analysis](https://dl.acm.org/doi/epdf/10.1145/3777416) DAOs have emerged as a novel organizational structure, attracting growing interest due to their decentralized, transparent governance, which replaces traditional hierarchies with stakeholder-managed rules codified as smart contracts. Although var- ious governance models exist, comparative research across dimensions remains limited, leaving the literature fragmented and offering little practical guidance for selecting suitable models. This paper critically analyses existing governance mechanisms and their implementation to support the development of more effective DAO models. To address current gaps, we review prior quantitative studies and conduct exploratory data analysis on centralization, participation, and decision controversy. The findings show that reputation and share-based models can mitigate the centralization seen in token-based systems, though all models suffer from low member engagement, suggesting an over reliance on direct democracy. Our analysis can be replicated across platforms and time frames to refine and validate these insights. - [Perils of current DAO governance](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/381404281_Perils_of_current_DAO_governance)DAO Governance is currently broken. We survey the state of the art and find worrying conclusions. Vote buying, vote selling and coercion are easy. The wealthy rule, decentralisation is a myth. Hostile take-overs are incentivised. Ballot secrecy is non-existent or short lived, despite being a human right. Verifiablity is achieved at the expense of privacy. These privacy concerns are highlighted with case study analyses of Vocdoni's governance protocol. This work presents two contributions: firstly a review of current DAO governance protocols, and secondly, an illustration of their vulnerabilities, showcasing the privacy and security threats these entail. - [Governance of a DAO for Facilitating Dialogue on Human-Algorithm Interaction and the Impact of Emerging Technologies on Society](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/371868968_Governance_of_a_DAO_for_Facilitating_Dialogue_on_Human-Algorithm_Interaction_and_the_Impact_of_Emerging_Technologies_on_Society)Human-algorithm interaction is a crucial issue for humanity in light of the impacts of the recent release of ChatGPT3 and 4, among others. These advanced chatbots provoked a worldwide debate in March/2023, when a manifesto signed by several stakeholders was published and widely discussed in the media and academia. This work assumes that human-algorithm interactions are influenced by a context of diverse interests and perspectives, which adds high complexity to the problem. Therefore, this work proposes a solution to enable the effective participation of stakeholders from different domains and society in a constructive dialogue, using digital platforms as a medium. Inspired by the successful governance of the Internet infrastructure ecosystem, the proposal involves the creation of an Autonomous Decentralized Organization (DAO) implemented in the blockchain environment of the Ethereum network. However, before implementing the DAO, it is necessary to build a knowledge base, that is, an ontology, which guides its development in a safe and adequate way. A preliminary version of this knowledge base was manually built using Protégé with over 4,000 axioms. - [Decentralization illusion in Decentralized Finance: Evidence from tokenized voting in MakerDAO polls](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1572308924000718/pdfft?md5=8da700335ef926889dff005b6615389f&pid=1-s2.0-S1572308924000718-main.pdf) Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) is very popular in Decentralized Finance (DeFi) applications as it provides a decentralized governance solution through blockchain. We analyze the governance characteristics in the Maker protocol, its stablecoin DAI and its governance token Maker (MKR). To achieve that, we establish several measurements of centralized governance. Our empirical analysis investigates the effect of centralized governance over a series of factors related to MKR and DAI, such as financial, network and Twitter sentiment indicators. Our results show that governance centralization influences the Maker protocol and that the distribution of voting power matters. The main implication of this study is that centralized governance in MakerDAO very much exists, while DeFi investors face a trade-off between decentralization and performance of a DeFi protocol. This further contributes to the contemporary debate over whether DeFi can be truly decentralized. - [One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control](https://download.ssrn.com/nber/nber_w2347.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjELr%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIQDOVIDKyleVfURv9RBMvPA5Pvwztbo4u1JRLzhYQX%2F7jgIgNgckcTPEwGNHmdNJX32hgOlHIi1LpI1Ges2NVRm5JpUqxgUIgv%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAEGgwzMDg0NzUzMDEyNTciDDiVhmdYwnMLUc7yyiqaBcHljFkHD1K1VWEJ6jB9GLvD3ysqjepfB0Z3C2fQ7yX5i2JyELBbKBb5Z8XDD7torcfkqjiDKBafV0rgpULhsUvAdmhLH7tpTXr5lSfhhvzCl9I0uZy7Aa%2FP1%2F%2FKA2I7jWxlTlCtyn%2BD%2Fkcj1ryGv8NoHj1FosCKWMotN22h4pNanzUC6PjFTRANWVfreXi6BahTiwe6%2BrM4IUBV5NOjSVKykvZMR6k4recCattd%2B%2BDVBMNSLgPLW3GstrGTBhSu7NStxOYYyGyUwS2LTqbr4CkMBIOzA2hR7gd%2F6AsA%2FlD8SVWt4od1i8%2FdN3mSK3s%2FaYgf3NuodgZ%2Fo0Bna366BXHc6F9gMy2V%2BypOncsht6Sit%2BhED7IEv%2FllqtD1eNdfqz5NIWTQBkGhe9ixMgjorFe92%2BAESFpuLFocAupVnbMSMpCiIbeXfgTC%2FYL7%2FGAtTshx43ATDna3dMPYuxZ%2Bg7M3i4dPJiAh6V068q6JnDrXjr%2BOFy%2FMg8%2FbmTyoJx%2Ba5siSXlSKMLa%2F9jgBICD%2Baxhnm3xigOuNg1dvokEtGQoL6q0UwusZNx8ORpvXjLW5Ly3lOGCubZnE3K0pCYb7CQXVO2S%2FbVzJfJPeLM1lhqoQWmbxC6vWdEYlRelTLKCSr0OQ3sWe9o8%2FFJNUluEjCR7m1tOd81ttzJ%2B7Sr2rjfwtw16RRhpmcg0dIavRs2%2BA1Wgw%2FENp0RSKNHNkENwjvplq3jvQntzmRM1svpwy7suu2fqYcCTytwQPQMAOjEh7%2FYbW8N%2F18P1ZEjOwjPunS8iSURpP3qdYbQKjPP9P5xLO54s2HhHpU7q0S9IsrFuJLfcwPJmMNsi9a6%2FKp7Sb3WAogyflfkyogH%2FTOSWV%2FI0WbTFIqhgh47LRsTCs6oXOBjqxAfA%2Fcj2tAqhCYLGoQhLv27MH50ViBM1yMGLYTdIgdFS8w7b8ymAHb%2BK0NS%2FSwZT5RFatxa%2BhmdS6tADHqhfdOiqlJdPzx1JhZjVdWyG18FLR4dPtFTge0oRaHIuYGJdxBGiVoMdTtXZL8sXxLX4YeUVTnekj%2BFLSLoDNrN80TZBCGwwIJH9xkABIw0v%2F2CGOmVXAseh3pnkTkEfEoT1p8XFwcHmuVaq1%2BTQ1IEMxrS2cXw%3D%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20260323T180906Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWE3FS4JZNI%2F20260323%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=99a537baf5d5f6915cf648d938cd8b56b22fe4859891fd246c0b630f8c09f9fd&abstractId=976159) A corporation's securities provide the holder with particular claims on the firm's income stream and particular voting rights. These securities can be designed in various ways: one share of a particular class may have a claim to votes which is disproportionately larger or smaller than its claim to income. In this paper we analyze some of the forces which make it desirable to set up the corporation so that all securities have the same proportion of votes as their claim to income ("one share/one vote"). We show that security structure influences both the conditions under which a control change takes place and the terms on which it occurs. First, the allocation of voting rights to securities determines which securities a party must acquire in order to win control. Secondly, the assignment of income claims to the same securities determines the cost of acquiring these voting rights. We will show that it is in shareholders' interest to set the cost of acquiring control to be as large as possible, consistent with a control change occurring whenever this increases shareholder wealth. Under certain assumptions, one share/one vote best achieves this goal. We distinguish between two classes of benefits from control: private benefits and security benefits. The private benefits of control refer to benefits the current management or the acquirer obtain for themselves, but which the target security holders do not obtain. The security benefits refer to the total market value of the corporation's securities. The assignment of income claims to voting rights determines the extent 'to which an acquirer must face competition from parties who value the firm for its security benefits rather than its private benefits. NOTE: Included to provide perspective from corporate governance and shareholder voting for comparison - [Analyzing voting power in decentralized governance: Who controls DAOs?](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2096720924000216) We empirically study the state of three prominent DAO governance systems on the [Ethereum](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-science/ethereum) [blockchain](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-science/blockchain): Compound, Uniswap and Ethereum name service (ENS). In particular, we examine how the voting power is distributed in these systems. Using a comprehensive dataset of all governance token holders, delegates, proposals, and votes, we analyze who holds the voting power and how this power is being used to influence governance decisions. While we reveal that the majority of voting power is concentrated in the hands of a small number of addresses, we rarely observe these powerful entities overturning a vote by choosing a different outcome than that of the overall community and less influential voters. - [DAO Research Trends: Reflections and Learnings from the First European DAO Workshop (DAWO)](https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/15/7/3491) Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) represent a transformative shift in organizational structures, combining decentralized governance with blockchain-based smart contracts. While DAOs present significant opportunities for innovation, they are confronted with several unresolved challenges, such as the centralization of power, the design of effective governance mechanisms, and the legal uncertainties surrounding their operation. Drawing on insights from recent studies and discussions presented in July 2024 at DAWO24, the first European DAO Workshop, this article explores these issues. The purpose of this article is to identify and analyze the critical research streams in DAO studies, particularly in governance mechanisms, technical frameworks, value assessment, and legal dimensions. A systematic approach, following the PRISMA methodology, was employed to analyze contributions from 14 extended abstracts and 11 full papers presented at DAWO24. The findings highlight the need for more equitable governance structures, secure and scalable technical frameworks, standardized tools for assessing DAOs’ value, and coherent legal frameworks to support decentralized operations. The article concludes by outlining future research directions, urging interdisciplinary collaboration to address current gaps and optimize DAO design, operation, and regulation. - [The Illusion of Democracy— Why Voting in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Is Doomed to Fail]([https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4441178](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/4441178.pdf?abstractid=4441178&mirid=1&type=2)) This article presents the first in-depth analysis of the reality of voting within Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) by examining over 4,963 voting events through a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods. DAOs have risen to prominence as an innovation in business organization models, with advocates highlighting their potential to offer democratic, non-hierarchical governance, lower agency costs, and evade regulatory oversight. However, this study reveals that DAOs are inherently susceptible to low voter participation, contradicting their decentralized ethos by potentially centralizing decision-making power and casting doubt on their democratic promise. These findings carry significant implications for the classification of DAO tokens as securities, hinging on their genuinely decentralized decision-making attributes. This article suggests policy interventions to stimulate voter engagement and foster genuine decentralization. Additionally, it introduces a novel regulatory framework—the “probationary business classification”— for DAO classification, considering the dynamic nature of DAO governance. This approach seeks to reconcile the decentralized ambitions of DAOs with the realities of their operational structures, potentially reshaping the regulatory landscape for DAO tokens. - [Economic DAO governance: A contestable control approach](https://pdf.sciencedirectassets.com/778493/1-s2.0-S2096720925X0004X/1-s2.0-S2096720925000338/main.pdf?X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjELz%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJIMEYCIQCWLNFO7406jR90SiFjqj1nzXTOUMiwc16JH%2Fq3J%2BmafQIhALiFubQlrbnLWWSL8S9z0t21yQYb6zauz0n5qpEPmnB4KrwFCIX%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEQBRoMMDU5MDAzNTQ2ODY1IgxPkAN%2Fasf%2Bw4P4EpgqkAW8TbrrvwJ4oYH2T9haJXwTY1Cv4ACnNxxG0C7SNuJp9ZJNJs9G3n1GPADUKQv6mG9q6P%2FZ2cxnU3%2B%2FMBDzU9eWMLhjnT%2BOeDXIpcfm6kaOpXI2Ir1%2BcAH2dfdzUfhIpr2KBeLN95CqBPxqJ4ppw28Jhovhx3WDyUeg1M4QnYq06MdEgRzp53SF32RnUgjjU06u5oylgCkopbnX2%2FK1E474frQfWHuzjoxQM3vUcTQ1pPWKHJXvJiuqYJMwGhNptOMUFWEMcSH1IUR2eIuPosufLeeaM7n6AXZRBzl5dskqtdK4fWSj6b7RXck7XUB1W2%2BgtZCp%2F13FwI89AHhSzHWCgGrpDwwhiXrTvWpxJob6s3vON0IhxQIclHpOk9Hn8H%2Bua729pEL8hQKMWnu%2FZyWfG3yUuNbI1XwYw%2F8xFj846mBkPGUUQb0loWw3Cffp4PV%2BU5V1IKVDIrFxM6cXC6jhFA6yl%2BCkkQdz6ds5%2BMuNaldlEs5VzqNBZgHlacgZYs2M5UtjYhkox%2FWRArHuTmPsQ4GCh3%2BC6ZtHRxgTFClwkfLtS89UULzl5hr8CYxHQaCLZAHa7KuCXWW7m5h7DElHu8c5oyTP%2F0htkDQ%2BmdSq7TyEBivlQWJ2dZSXBzpDAheaEkQnnIX12wEpPgMpEnuIeSfBGQ%2F%2FGH%2B9H%2BK1p4lShO2V0f%2BpS6WwMdXwA%2BBmdZnim65vHKVk5FZwB9UB5fT5zVSXPu1G0cjxism9S%2BXpB4DbmNXmTzAvBWkcB78vbjZVIIECI1ghGcueZyRnc%2FzqzCIqlZG62xEHcQgr5MKpyuQbXSeTnpG57nF9jzUTe5kC51hBAjZkJDKkxrv92fRybpByNRkKE7vkqrXBhqx%2BwDCKrYbOBjqwATuCI2Kkgkld9DwReIiWFc%2FSUEIHrY6ZFJTxKmR%2FVf1sFhfNKM66qgmwtTVcAvlV8rEgyK5KG8YMeQAzRvWl%2BgrYINCV%2FaAsHafJ8Jpq4JkFxVefrl8IxccSPxl6i%2F%2Bf2ONg%2FwJFJ%2F%2Ba9SvWa9Cxux%2B8ZfIRxCg3IsCgI9o2DpislWrBE51%2BtWtsAAWprIMRTsxC7vrWkmb%2BTpatqDceeQZZZXzvLfq2nEW1duf4h1Bc&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20260323T201838Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAQ3PHCVTYQILMYGO2%2F20260323%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=a77fd0e9b7c3284ed6c2ad39cc4fdac8fa3da8f7a764fa189478c0c88deb10a6&hash=a3141ae06dd324819d3a2933bfaaa9f0faea16ead4f19c5404371a511f03b091&host=68042c943591013ac2b2430a89b270f6af2c76d8dfd086a07176afe7c76c2c61&pii=S2096720925000338&tid=spdf-4155cd5f-48b4-4ec4-9d6f-b4f7259fbfd5&sid=7bc51f14295bb64e4c59eb096159e15c4905gxrqa&type=client&tsoh=d3d3LnNjaWVuY2VkaXJlY3QuY29t&rh=d3d3LnNjaWVuY2VkaXJlY3QuY29t&ua=0f165d06505e565755&rr=9e10205fa8ff8c6f&cc=us) In this article, we propose a new form of decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) governance that uses a sequential auction mechanism to overcome the entrenched control issues that have emerged for DAOs by creating a regime of temporary contestable control. The mechanism avoids potential public choice problems inherent in voting approaches but at the same time provides a vehicle that can enhance and secure value that inheres to DAO voting and other DAO non-market governance procedures. It is robust to empty voting and is code feasible. The mechanism not only facilitates the ability of DAOs to meet their normative and operational goals in the face of diverse regulatory approaches, but also strengthens the case for creating a less burdensome but at least equally effective regulatory regime for DAOs that employ the mechanism. Designed to shift control to the party with the most promising business plan, at the same time, it deters value destruction by control parties, maximizes social surplus, and distributes that surplus in a way that tends to promote investment by other parties both at start up and on an ongoing basis. -