user : decentralized enforcement o subjective rules assistant : ### What specific governance challenge or problem are you observing? Please be as concrete as possible about what's happening and why it matters. user : Most onchain orgs & businesses rely on a rule set where rules require interpretation, i.e. rules have a degree on subjectivity. Those rules cannot be enforced deterministically, but require outside (typically human) input. Enforcement of subjective rules is poor in most onchain orgs, resulting in lack of dependability (compared to traditional offchain legal structures). This in turn inhibits the growth of decentralized organizations and business models. What we observe in practice is that when it comes to enforcement of subjective rules, DAOs and other organizations often fall back on highly centralized decision-making that is intransparent and potentially unfair. Furthermore this creates legal risks and uncertainty for stakeholders. assistant : ### What evidence or examples demonstrate this is a real problem? This could include failed proposals, low participation rates, specific incidents, data you've observed, or patterns you've noticed across projects. user : Ah - already started answering this above :-) assistant : What specific incidents, projects, or patterns have you observed where this centralized fallback or lack of enforcement created problems? user : Typical patterns: assistant : Thank you for noting you've started on this. Could you share 2-3 concrete examples - specific DAOs, incidents, or situations where you've seen this centralized fallback or enforcement failure play out? user : Sorry I accidentally pressed enter - here you go: (i) oracle failures or disputes in prediction markets (ii) investment rules in DAO treasuries being unclear and the source of contention (iii) foundations overriding DAO member votes (iv) self-dealing and quid-pro-quo handouts of DAO treasury funds assistant : Would you like to share another governance problem, or should we move on to exploring solutions and who's working on them? user : let's move on assistant : ### What approaches, tools, or mechanisms could address the governance problems we've discussed? Share any potential solutions you're aware of or have considered - these could be technical tools, process innovations, research directions, or organizational approaches. user : - enforcement by committees - dispute resolution protocols / subjective oracles relying on game-theoretic mechanisms (Kleros, UMA) - restaking protocols (Eigen, Symbiotic) assistant : ### Which teams, projects, or researchers do you know are actively working on these solutions or related governance innovations? This helps us map who's contributing to solving these challenges. user : sorry continuing from above (this includes mechanisms & projects/teams): - mix of elected enforcement committee and external dispute resolution (QGOV) - concept stage: forking protocol ("Backstop L2"), contestable control - AI-based rule enforcement (some teams working on this but still highly experimental in my view) assistant : Are there specific teams or researchers you know working on the AI-based rule enforcement, the forking protocol concept, or the contestable control approach? user : forking: paper by Silke Noa et al, not sure anyone is working on implementation contestable control: paper by Jeff Strnad, currently I'm working on an experimental implementation myself assistant : Would you like to share more solutions or identify additional actors working in this space, or should we move to wrapping up? user : let's move on assistant : ### Thank you for mapping governance challenges and solutions Here's a summary of your contributions: **Problems Identified:** - Decentralized enforcement of subjective rules: Most onchain orgs rely on rules requiring interpretation, but enforcement is poor compared to traditional legal structures. This leads to centralized, intransparent decision-making fallbacks that create legal risks and inhibit growth of decentralized organizations. **Evidence Provided:** - Oracle failures/disputes in prediction markets - Unclear investment rules in DAO treasuries causing contention - Foundations overriding DAO member votes - Self-dealing and quid-pro-quo handouts of DAO treasury funds **Solutions & Approaches:** - Enforcement by committees - Dispute resolution protocols/subjective oracles using game-theoretic mechanisms (Kleros, UMA) - Restaking protocols (Eigen, Symbiotic) - Mix of elected enforcement committee and external dispute resolution (QGOV) - Forking protocol ("Backstop L2") - concept stage - Contestable control - AI-based rule enforcement (experimental) **Active Contributors:** - Kleros - UMA - Eigen - Symbiotic - QGOV - Silke Noa et al (forking protocol paper) - Jeff Strnad (contestable control paper) - Martin Schmidt (experimental implementation of contestable control) - Various teams exploring AI-based enforcement (experimental stage) Your input will be synthesized with other participants' contributions to help build the gov/acc research roadmap. This will inform the visualization and workshop at EthCC, where we'll work on coordinated solutions to these governance challenges. Does this summary capture your main points accurately, or would you like to clarify or add anything? user : yes this captures it - thanks assistant : Thank you for participating in phase 1 of gov/acc research, Martin! Your insights on subjective rule enforcement and the various solution approaches will be valuable for mapping the governance landscape and informing the work at EthCC. 🙏