user : Fair dispute resolution, starting with juror or adjudicator selection in dispute resolution assistant : ### What specific governance challenge or problem are you observing? Please be as concrete as possible about what's happening and why it matters. user : The core challenge is the failure of juror selection mechanisms across both traditional and decentralised governance. - **In Conventional Systems:** The process for identifying competent and honest adjudicators is opaque and suboptimal. There is a massive disproportion between the number of available jurors and the volume of active disputes. This imbalance creates severe case backlogs, effectively denying timely justice. - **In Decentralised Systems:** While seeking to solve traditional biases, these systems lack a clear, standardised framework for selecting private jurors, often leading to uncertainty regarding their legitimacy and expertise. assistant : ### What evidence or examples demonstrate this is a real problem? This could include failed proposals, low participation rates, specific incidents, data you've observed, or patterns you've noticed across projects. user : 1. Backlogs - As of late 2026, the Indian judicial system faces a backlog of over 54 million pending disputes. As of mid-2025, the Crown Court in England and Wales faced a backlog of over **77,000 cases**. 1. Transparency and Corruption Gap Judiciary in many States is perceived as corrupt or influenced by opaque appointment processes. 2. Crowdsourced/Decentralised Legitimacy Dilemma Platforms like Kleros have handled over 1,600 disputes. They rely on "Schelling Point" game theory, where jurors are incentivised to vote with the majority to earn rewards. But there aren’t clear legal frameworks which explicitly legitimises this. Moreover, unlike traditional legal systems which set standards for adjudicators, crowdsources systems don’t always have appropriate checks in place, to ensure that justice was truly delivered. assistant : Would you like to share another governance problem, or should we move on to exploring solutions and who's working on them? user : explore solutions assistant : ### What approaches, tools, or mechanisms could address the governance problems we've discussed? Share any potential solutions you're aware of or have considered - these could be technical tools, process innovations, research directions, or organizational approaches. user : - Reputation-over-Revenue Systems: Transitioning from purely economic stakes to systems using Soulbound Tokens (SBTs) or non-transferable reputation. A juror’s "weight" in a dispute is determined by their history of participation, the fairness of their past rulings, and their proven subject-matter expertise. - Constitutional Juror Approval: Instead of a blind lottery, people first apply to become potential jurors. The process could be managed by a DAO which sets standards on juror requirements. DAO vets a pool of qualified jurors for specific courts dedicated to specific subject matters. This pool is refreshed via voting, ensuring they reflect the community's current values. From this point forth, the jurors may be assigned for cases randomly, and based on subject matter experience. - Records: Using blockchain to create an immutable record of the Juror’s decisions, adherence to rules, etc. assistant : ### Which teams, projects, or researchers do you know are actively working on these solutions or related governance innovations? This helps us map who's contributing to solving these challenges. user : Kleros already has a system in place. But it's not foolproof. Some issues persists. assistant : What specific issues persist with Kleros's current system, and are there other teams or researchers you're aware of working on alternative approaches to juror selection or dispute resolution? user : While Kleros is a pioneer, some core problems persists. Firstly, because jurors are incentivised to vote with the majority (the Schelling Point), they may not vote for what is right, but for what they think everyone else will say. With Kleros, the probability of being selected is proportional to the number of tokens you stake. This means wealthy participants can dominate juries regardless of their expertise in the subject matter. assistant : Are there other teams, projects, or researchers beyond Kleros that you're aware of working on dispute resolution or juror selection mechanisms - perhaps ones trying to address these token-weighted or game-theoretic issues? user : Kleros has a research team. Kleros v2.0 is implementing "Modular Dispute Kits." These allow specific "sub-courts" to require Soulbound Tokens (SBTs) or expertise filters Others include - Astraea Model (although I'm not personally familiar with this) - Fair-Spread family of algorithms, where Bhargavi Sriram and John Augustine at IIT-M are developing algorithms specifically designed to ensure fair representation and workload balance assistant : Would you like to share more solutions or identify additional actors working in this space, or should we move to wrapping up? user : Let's wrap up. assistant : ### Thank you for mapping governance challenges and solutions Here's a summary of your contributions: **Problems Identified:** - Fair dispute resolution, specifically juror/adjudicator selection mechanisms failing across both traditional and decentralized systems - In conventional systems: opaque selection processes and severe imbalance between available jurors and dispute volume - In decentralized systems: lack of clear, standardized frameworks for selecting jurors, leading to uncertainty about legitimacy and expertise **Evidence Provided:** - Massive case backlogs: 54 million pending disputes in India (late 2026), 77,000+ cases in England and Wales Crown Court (mid-2025) - Perceived corruption and opaque appointment processes in traditional judiciaries - Kleros has handled 1,600+ disputes but lacks explicit legal framework legitimization - Decentralized systems lack appropriate checks to ensure justice is truly delivered, unlike traditional legal standards for adjudicators **Solutions & Approaches:** - Reputation-over-Revenue Systems using Soulbound Tokens (SBTs) or non-transferable reputation to weight juror influence based on participation history, fairness of past rulings, and subject-matter expertise - Constitutional Juror Approval process where DAOs vet qualified juror pools for specific subject-matter courts, with periodic voting to refresh pools - Blockchain-based immutable records of juror decisions and rule adherence **Active Contributors:** - Kleros (pioneer with existing system, research team working on v2.0 with Modular Dispute Kits allowing SBTs and expertise filters in sub-courts) - Astraea Model (you noted unfamiliarity with details) - Bhargavi Sriram and John Augustine at IIT-M (developing Fair-Spread family of algorithms for fair representation and workload balance) Your input will be synthesized with other participants' contributions to help build the gov/acc research roadmap. This will inform the visualization and workshop at EthCC, where we'll work on coordinated solutions to these governance challenges. Does this summary capture your main points accurately, or would you like to clarify or add anything?